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Readjudicating Partial Verdicts:
Wallace v. Havener
In Wallace v. Havener,' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a
state court's decision to declare a mistrial under unusual circumstances.
The primary issue reviewed by the court was whether the trial judge's
failure to accept a four-count partial verdict on a five-count indictment,
coupled with the readjudication of every count of the indictment, subjected
the defendant to double jeopardy. More particularly, the Sixth Circuit
considered whether the potential effect of collateral estoppel during the
subsequent retrial of the undecided issue would have justified the
relitigation of the entire case.
This Case Comment presents an analysis of the Wallace case. Virst,
a historical foundation is supplied from which to analyze the issues
involved in Wallace. Second, the facts as well as the lower courts'
disposition of the case are summarized. Finally, an analysis of the
majority and dissenting opinions is presented. This review will indicate
that because the controlling Supreme Court decisions are equivocal both
the Wallace majority and dissent were able to rely on them as support for
their positions. As a final matter, the writer of this Case Comment will
argue that the majority opinion of the Sixth Circuit is more consistent with
the dictates of the double jeopardy clause and our system of justice than is
the dissenting opinion.
I. A HISTORICAL REFERENCE POINT
Engrained in American heritage and history2 is the principle that "no
person shall be ... subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy.3 This principle, expressed by the United States Constitution's
double jeopardy clause, represents a policy of finality in the prosecution of
an individual.4 It prohibits a prosecutor from using the government's
wealth of resources in repeated attempts to gain a conviction. 5 Its purpose
is to free the defendant from the continuing state of anxiety, expense and
embarrassment accompanying any criminal trial.6  The policy is also
meant to guard against the possibility that the defendant, even though
1. 552 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1977).
2. See generally M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479-86 (1971).
5. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
6. Id.
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innocent, may be found guilty.7  Another consideration recognized in
recent Supreme Court decisions is the defendant's right to receive a
particular tribunars verdict, one which he may feel will favorably dispose
of his case.8
As the law now stands, it is undisputed thatjeopardy attaches once the
jury is impanelled.9 To grant this constitutional protection at such an
early stage of the adversary proceeding furthers the objectives of the fifth
amendment but creates potential problems. A literal application of the
doublejeopardy clause would require release of the accused any time a trial
was prematurely aborted-even for such an uncontrollable event as the
death of a juror. But the law now recognizes that a trial strives not only to
protect the defendant's rights but also to redress those acts society deems
harmful to social order.
Under certain circumstances such as the untimely death of a juror,
society's right to a fair and complete adjudication of the crime will prevail
over the defendant's right to receive a particular tribunals verdict. Should
the trial judge correctly find that such circumstances exist, he possesses the
power to declare a mistrial; the doublejeopardy clause will not intervene to
prohibit reprosecution of the accused. If the appellate court decides that
under the particular circumstances of a mistrial and reprosecution the
rights of the defendant outweigh the rights of society, the trial judge will be
found to have abused his power. The consequence of an erroneous
judgment by the trial judge is the release of the defendant for those
unconstitutionally relitigated charges-even if the second prosecution
resulted in conviction.
The test governing appellate review of a trial judge's decision to
declare a mistrial was promulgated in United States v. Perez,10 decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1824. In Perez, the trial judge had
declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to agree on a verdict. The
defendant had been retried and convicted. On appeal, Perez argued that
the retrial had deprived him of his fifth amendment rights by placing him in
double jeopardy. In its review of the trial judge's decision, the Supreme
Court articulated what has since been labeled the manifest necessity test:
7. Id. at 188.
8. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23,34 (1977) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,689 (1949)
(Brennan, J., concurring)); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 474 (1973) (White, J., dissenting);
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion).
9. Crist v. Bretz, 98S. Ct. 2156 (1978). "lhe federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury
is empaneled and sworn is an integral part of the constitutional guarantee against doublejeopardy."
Id. at 2162. See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (jeopardy attaches at a juvenile court
adjudicative hearing when the trier of facts begins to hear evidence); McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610 (1936) (in nonjury trial jeopardy attaches when the trier of facts
begins to hear evidence). But cf. Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978) (reversing three-julge district
court ruling that jeopardy attaches at evidentiary hearing conducted by master empowered to
recommend findings of fact to juvenile court judge).
10. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
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We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law ha; invested Courts ofjustice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict,
whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstance3 into consideration,
there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject;
and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it
proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest
caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious11
causes ....
The Court in Perez found that thejury's inability to reach a verdict satisfied
the manifest necessity test. Thus, the trial judge's declaration of a mistrial
and the retrial of Perez had not violated the double jeopardy clause. For
more than a century after Perez, mistrial declarations were routinely
affirmed under the manifest necessity test.12 Typical circumstances held to
justify a retrial of the accused included jury inability to agree on a verdict 3
and any form of juror contamination likely to prejudice the trial.' 4
During the past thirty years, appellate courts have reviewed cases
presenting atypical circumstances and the problems inherent in the Perez
test have begun to surface. First, the Court did not indicate in Perez the
outer boundaries of "manifest necessity" or "the defeat of the ends of
public justice," the phrases that it had used to describe the circumstances
that will justify a retrial. Second, ever since Perez, the Supreme Court has
steadfastly refused to supply definitions for these terms or in any way to
delimit the applicability of the manifest necessity test.'s Concededly, this
reluctance may stem from the Court's recognition that a trial judge
oversees a unique interplay of events during each trial and must wield
considerable discretionary power in order to deal appropriately with
particular situations as they may arise. The result, however, is that trial
judges lack meaningful guidelines to assist them when they determine
whether the circumstances justify the declaration of a mistrial. Thus, the
ambit of the defendant's constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy
is uncertain.
Recent decisions indicate the Court's willingness to find that manifest
necessity exists when uncontrollable events have terminated the trial
prematurely. A classic example is the exigency faced by the trial court in
Wade v. Hunter.16 Wade, an American soldier stationed in Germany
during World War II, had been charged with rape. The trial began;
11. Id. at 580.
12. See Note, Mistrial and Double Jeopardy, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 937, 941 (1974).
13. Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) Logan v.
United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
14. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (disqualification ofjuror who was member
of grand jury that had indicated defendant); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (juror had
lied during voir dire about his acquaintance with defendant).
15. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,462 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,480
(1971); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949).
16. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
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because of the Division's tactical situation, however, the Commanding
General was forced to have the case transferred to a different location for a
new trial.
A mistrial is also justified by a "breakdown of the judicial machinery
such as happens when the judge is stricken, or ajuror has been disqualified
to sit, or when it is impossible or impractical to hold a trial at the time and
place set."17 For example, if juror contamination is discovered and no
alternate jurors are available, the trial judge cannot allow the trial to
continue because a fair and impartial verdict cannot be reached. While it
would be unjust to the defendant to allow the trial to continue in the face of
juror contamination, it would be equally unjust to society if the double
jeopardy clause barred retrial of the accused. Society has a strong interest
iii the enforcement of the law; it would defeat the "ends of publicjustice" to
deny society the opportunity to obtain full and fair adjudication of the
crime.
It should be recognized that these two categories, uncontrollable
events and breakdown of the judicial machinery, emerge only through this
writer's analysis of previous case law. They should not be construed as
definitions for "manifest necessity" and "the defeat of the ends of public
justice." Although individual members of the Court have discussed these
two categories as if they constituted the boundaries of the manifest
necessity test,18 the Court refuses to be bound by a rigid formulation)9
The equivocal language that concludes the Perez test exacerbates the
Court's failure to delimit the boundaries of "manifest necessity" and "the
ends of publicjustice. 20 In Perez, the Court stated that trialjudges "are to
exercise a sound discretion [before declaring a mistrial]; and it is
impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to
interfere.",2' This statement appears to support the proposition that once a
mistrial has been declared, the double jeopardy clause should not prohibit
a retrial unless there is evidence that the trial judge abused his discretion.
The Court continued, however, with language that might controvert that
proposition: "To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest of
caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious
causes . . .,22 The last-quoted language would seem to suggest that a
17. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. See id.
19. See cases cited at note 15 supra.
20. For furtherdiscussion of the ambiguities of the Pereztestand theproblemsthatthiscreates.
see Comment, Double Jeopardy-Trial Courts Granted Broad Discretion to Determine "Afanifest
Necessity"for Mistrial, 26 RUrGERS L. REv. 682 (1973); see also Note, supra note 12. For an
interpretation that provides three possible meanings for the Perez test, see Comment Double.Jeopardy
and Reprosecution After Mistrial: Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessar., 69 Nw. L.
REv. 887, 891-94 (1975).
21. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
22. Id.
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mistrial precludes retrial absent demonstration by the state of justifying
circumstances.
The significance of this language should not be underemphasized.
Under the first interpretation, it must be shown that the trial judge abused
his power by declaring a mistrial. If neither "manifest necessity" nor "the
ends of public justice" compelled the mistrial declaration, the trial judge
abused his power. It shoud be recalled, however, that these two phrases
are undefined. Furthermore, case law fails to provide a method for
ascertaining the existence of such circumstances. Despite knowledge of
the law and favorable facts, counsel cannot be certain that he can establish
abuse of power by the trial judge. Because "it is impossible to define all of
the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere, ' 3 however,
this uncertainty tends to be resolved in favor of the trial judge's action,
On the other hand, the Perez opinion requires that such power "be
used with the greatest caution . . . and for very plain and obvious
causes. ... 24 Such phraseology appears to require that the record
disclose the reasons for the mistrial. Thus, any doubt regarding the
necessity for the mistrial should be resolved in favor of the accused's right
not to be placed in double jeopardy. In short, it seems that under the
former interpretation, a presumption arises to uphold the trial judge's
action on the basis of his discretionary power; the latter interpretation
appears to raise a presumption in favor of the accused's fifth amendment
rights. In fact, the interpretation may dictate the incarceration or release
of the accused.
The uncertainties of the Perez test are partially resolved when one of
the two interpretations is adopted. The policy orientation of the
individual judge may determine his choice of interpretation. Judges who
perceive themselves as protectors of individual rights and liberties will
choose the interpretation of the Perez test that allows the broadest
application of fifth amendment protection. These judges will emphasize
the individual's right to receive a particular tribunars verdict. "Necessi-
ty," strictly construed, will justify a retrial; anything less, for example,
prosecutorial negligence,25 should not justify subjecting the accused to
another trial. Judges who regard themselves primarily as enforcers of the
social order will give more consideration to complete adjudication of the
crime. Under the latter view, society's interests should be subordinated to
the accused's only when the defendant has suffered obvious and unjustified
anxiety, expense and embarrassment in a second proceeding.26
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Illinois v. Somerville, 4 10 U.S. 458,471-83 (1973) (White,J., dissenting); Downumv. United
States. 372 U.S. 734. 737 (1963).
26. See. e.g.. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23,32-33 (1977); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,530-31
(1975): Illinois v. Somerville,410 U.S. 458,469-70 (1973); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734,739-
42 (1963) (Clark. J.. dissenting).
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE Wallace CASE
Robert Wallace was brought to trial for his alleged participation in a
June 1972, robbery of a Cleveland grocery store. He had been charged
under a five-count indictment: one count of armed robbery, three counts of
shooting with intent to kill, and a count of illegal possession of a firearm.
At trial, the jury returned with verdicts on the last four counts but stated
an inability to reach a verdict on the armed robbery count. The trial judge
subsequently declared a mistrial. He refused defense counsel's request to
have the jury sign the four verdicts that had been agreed upon; he also
refused to allow the determination of these verdicts to be revealed. Robert
Wallace was then retried and convicted on all five counts of the indictment.
On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals for the State of Ohio
rejected Wallace's claim that he had been placed in doublejeopardy by the
retrial of counts two through five.27 In support of its decision, the
appellate court cited Jackson v. State,28 in which the Ohio Supreme Court
had held that while a judge may receive a partial verdict, he is not bound to
do so. 29
When he had exhausted his state court remedies, Wallace petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio. The district court found merit in Wallace's
double jeopardy claim and granted the writ. According to the district
court, the trial judge could have accepted the partial verdict under the
authority of Selvester v. United States, 30 a case in which the Supreme
Court upheld a lower court's acceptance of a partial verdict and the retrial
of the accused on the undecided matters. The district court also stated
that as long as the jury had expressly stated its inability to reach a verdict
on the armed robbery count, Wallace could constitutionally have been
retried for that offense. The district court, unable to discern any other
circumstances that necessitated the declaration of a mistrial on the entire
indictment, found that the trialjudge had abused his discretion. The court
ordered that the conviction obtained in the second trial on counts two
through five be vacated. Despite a vigorous dissent by Judge Miller, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court.
III. THE WALLACE OPINIONS
The Wallace opinions reflect the inconsistent rulings that result from
27. State v. Wallace, No. 32404 (Ohio App., 8th Dist. Nov. 29, 1973).
28. 39 Ohio St. 37 (1883).
29. Reliance by the Court of Appeals on Jackson was not well founded. In Jackson, the trial
judge had refused to accept a partial verdict but had instructed the jury to return for further
deliberation. Subsequently, thejury returned with an entire verdict. Thus, Jackson does not stand f~or
the proposition that a trial judge has complete discretion simply to accept or reject a partial verdict.
30. 170 U.S. 262 (1898). Selvester held that if the jury expressly states its inability to reach a
verdict on a particular count of a multi-count indictment, a second trial on that count is constitutional.
If the jury fails to express the inability to reach averdict, there is an implicit acquittal on the count and
a retrial of that count is not permissible. Id. at 270.
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the inherent ambiguities of the Perez test. The majority found that Robert
Wallace had been placed in double jeopardy. The court felt not only that
the Perez test dictated this holding but also that recent Supreme Court
decisions supported a finding for Wallace. The dissenting judge, on the
other hand, believed that Wallace had not been deprived of his fifth
amendment rights. Although he disagreed with the majority on each
major issue, Judge Miller was able to cite authority equivalent to the
majority's-Perez and recent Supreme Court decisions-that seemingly
dictated the position he advocated. The absence of a precise standard and
the existence of authority to support divergent views indicates that the
judge's initial policy orientation may be decisive in resolving this double
jeopardy issue.31
The Sixth Circuit identified the Perez manifest necessity test as
controlling and determined that Robert Wallace had been placed in double
jeopardy by the retrial of the previously decided counts of the indictment.
The majority concurred with the district court that the failure of the jury to
return verdicts on the entire indictment was insufficient justification for a
retrial of all five counts of the indictment. The court's language made it
clear that the majority adhered to the view that the record must disclose
"plain and obvious reasons" that would justify the retrial of an individual:
In the present case, taking all the circumstances into consideration, we
are directed to no problem at the first trial which would warrant a
determination of manifest necessity to justify the discharge of the jury and
the refusal to accept the verdicts that the jury had reached on Counts 2
through 5.32
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Wallace follows a pattern of Supreme
Court decisions that have emphasized a need for disclosure of the facts
that justify the retrial and indicated a preference for the defendant's
constitutional right to receive a particular tribunal's verdict. For instance,
in Downum v. United States,33 the Supreme Court held that the accused
had been placed in doublejeopardy when the trial judge declared a mistrial
after the prosecution failed to have its witness present to testify. Downum
emphasized the exceptional nature of the circumstances that justify the
retrial of a defendant without his consent. The Supreme Court then
attempted to clarify the interest that should govern during appellate
review of this double jeopardy claim: "We resolve any doubt 'in favor of
the liberty of the citizen, rather than exercise what would be an unlimited,
uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion.' 4
A similar analysis was made by the plurality in Jorn v. United States.35
31. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
32. Wallace v. Havener, 552 F.2d 721, 723 (6th Cir. 1977).
33. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
34. Id. at 738 (quoting United States v. Watson, 28 F. Cas. 499,501 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No,
16,651)).
35. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
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In Jorn, the trial judge, who refused to believe that the government's
witness had been adequately apprised of his rights, had terminated the trial
because the witness began to make self-incriminating statements. A
plurality of the Court held that Jorn had been constitutionally deprived of
his "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.""
Over the dissenters' objection that there had been no prosecutorial
manipulation or judicial overreaching, the plurality ruled that the facts
failed to justify denying the accused the opportunity to complete the first
trial and perhaps be acquitted.37
Judge Miller's Wallace dissent contrasted sharply with the majority's
reasoning. He argued that the majority had misconstrued the basic
presumption underlying the Perez test: that because the trial judge's
position allowed him to assess the entire set of circumstances surrounding
the trial, his decision should be afforded a presumption of validity. The
dissent charged that the majority had subjected the trial judge's action to
overly sharp surveillance.
As this writer has argued, the language of the Perez test is susceptible
to the interpretation of the Wallace dissent.38 Judge Miller felt that the
Supreme Court's refusal to provide a mechanical test for the application of
the Perez test also supported his reasoning. As specific support for his
opinion, Judge Miller cited Gori v. United States.39 In Gori, the Supreme
Court upheld a trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial. The Court
focused on the broad discretion of the trial judge and emphasized that the
judge had apparently desired to prevent prejudicial questioning of the
defendant. The Court in Gori further emphasized that the record before it
was inadequate to support a reversal. Judge Miller's dissent in Wallace
also emphasized this point. He argued that the end result of the majority
opinion was to deny the trial judge the power to oversee the course of a
trial. To support this point, Judge Miller focused on the majority's failure
to insist on a complete record:
However, without all the circumstances before them, the court below
and the majority here have determined that the Ohio trial court judge
"abused his discretion" by failing to accept the partial verdict because there
was "no manifest necessity" for not doing so; that there was "no manifest
necessity" for not doing so, because he could have done so.40
Judge Miller's emphasis on the scant record before the Sixth Circuit
presents two problems. First, Wallace was admitted into the United
States District Court on a petition pro se for a writ of habeas corpus, 1
36. Id. at 484.
37. Id. at 486-87.
38. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
39. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
40. 552 F.2d at 725 (Miller, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
41. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Wallace v. Havener, 552 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1977).
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in which counsel and court determine the amount of record to be
submitted.42 Thus, it was particularly incumbent upon the prosecution to
submit that portion of the trial record that would have substantiated its
argument.43 Second, Judge Miller failed to acknowledge that the Sixth
Circuit's own Rules of Appellate Procedure limit the amount of transcript
that may be submitted to the court. 4
The majority and the dissent differed on another issue, the potential
effect of the doctrine of collateral estoppel at the trial level. This doctrine
precludes the relitigation of any previously litigated fact that is essential to
proving a crime. For instance, in order to prove that the defendant
committed armed robbery, one of the facts that the prosecution would
have to prove is that the defendant had used a weapon in the course of the
robbery. If this ultimate fact had been decided in favor of the defendant in
the earlier proceeding then the state would not be able to pursue a verdict
on the armed robbery charge even though the jury had been unable to
reach a verdict on that issue. The state argued that an acquittal of Wtllace
on counts two through five would constitute a determination that Wallace
did not have a gun in his possession at the time of the robbery. Those
counts charged Wallace with the offenses of shooting with intent to kill and
illegal possession of a firearm. Wallace's acquittal for these crimes would,
according to the state, deny society a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the crime of armed robbery because the doctrine of collateral estoppel
would prevent the relitigation of Wallace's possession of a gun. If the state
could not relitigate Wallace's possession of a gun, it was deprived of an
element essential for establishing a prima facie case of armed robbery. It
was argued that this deprivation would defeat the ends of justice, and
therefore the mistrial declaration was justified.
In fact, it is highly doubtful that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
posed a threat to the readjudication of the armed robbery charge. In Ashe
v. Swenson,45 the Supreme Court enunciated the test to be applied to
determine which facts that have previously been adjudicated may not be
relitigated because of their prior adjudication:
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CSES IN TlE UNIED STAts
DISTRICT COURTS 7.
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
44. 6TH CIR. R. 13. The persuasiveness of Judge Miller's opinion is also decreased if one
considers that this case originated in state court and that Ohio case and statutory law require the trial
judge to enter into the journal his reason for declaring the mistrial. See Hinesv. State, 24 Ohio St. 134
(1873); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.36 (Page 1975). Failure to make the appropriate journal entry
will acquit the defendant unless a subsequent order cures the omission. Benedict v. State, 44 Ohio St,
679, 11 N.E. 125 (1887). In Wallace, the trial court's journal entry and the state court of appeals
opinion do not indicate any basis for the mistrial declaration other than th-. opinion in Jackson v. State,
39 Ohio St. 37 (1883). Brief and Appendix of Respondent at 15B, WallAce v. Havener, 552 F,2d 721
(6th Cir. 1977). As previously indicated, Jackson fails to support the proposition that a trial judge has
complete discretion to accept or reject a partial verdict. See note 29 ard accompanying text supra.
45. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general
verdict ... a court [must] "examine the record of a prior proceeding,
taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant
matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict
upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
consideration."
46
Absent special interrogatories, a general acquittal on each of the last
four counts of the Wallace indictment would not have established any
ultimate fact vital to the reprosecution of the armed robbery count. The
statutes that Wallace was charged with violating may be paraphrased as
armed robbery, shooting with intent to kill, and illegal possession of a
firearm. Quite clearly the jury could have acquitted Wallace on the three
counts of shooting with intent to kill because the prosecution had failed to
prove the requisite intent. The final count, on its face, appears to require
the adjudication of Wallace's possession of a gun. If Wallace had been
acquitted of a possession charge, it would seem that there could be no
retrial of the armed robbery count because possession of a deadly weapon
is essential for establishing armed robbery. But the caption on the
indictment, "illegal possession of a firearm," is misleading because the
statute in force at the time prohibited only specific groups of people from
carrying firearms.47 For instance, an individual who had been adjudged
insane was prohibited from carrying a gun. Thus the jury could have
acquitted Wallace of the "possession" charge even if he had actually
possessed a gun, if it found that Wallace did not fall into any of the classes
of people whose actions the statute addressed 8
The majority in Wallace, although it did not articulate its reasoning,
was not persuaded by the state's argument. To the majority, that
argument suggested something "de hors the record.' '49 The majority
indicated that even if acceptance of the first four verdicts would effectively
have prevented relitigation of the armed robbery charge through the
46. Id. at 444 (footnotes omitted).
47. Wallace was charged with violating § 2923.56 of the Ohio Revised Code, entitled "Persons
prohibited from obtaining or having firearms:"
[Nbo person shall purchase, own, possess, receive, carry, control or use any firearm, if
such person is a fugitive from justice, is under indictment or has been convicted of any felony
of violence and involving moral turpitude or adjudged ajuvenile delinquent for commission
of any act which if committed by an adult would be such felony in this or any otherstate, the
United States or any of its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, is addicted
to or illegally uses any narcotic drug, hallucinogen, or other dangerous drug, is an habitual
drunkard, or is under adjudication of mental incompetence.
Amended Substitute House Bill, No. 484, § 2923.56, 133 Ohio Laws 2245 (1969) (repealed 1972,
effective 1974).
48. Neither the State's nor Wallace's brief or appendLx indicates the use of special interrogatories
at the trial. In short, the majority correctly asserted that the application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to the case before it suggested a fact pattern dehors the record. Had special interrogatories
been used to establish an ultimate fact adverse to reprosecution, the prosecutor would have been able to
argue this point.
49. 552 F.2d at 723.
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operation of collateral estoppel, this would not create the requisite
necessity that would justify early discharge of ajury, Rather, the court felt
that if the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented a relitigation of the
armed robbery charge "the ends of public justice would be served.""5t
Judge Miller rejected the majority's treatment of the collateral
estoppel issue. He noted that Selvester,5' which allowed the acceptance of
partial verdicts, had been decided before the doctrine of collateral estoppel
had been incorporated into the fifth amendment. Judge Miller would
have sustained the trial judge's action. In his opinion, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel would have prevented relitigation of the armed robbery
charge, a serious crime that deserved complete adjudication for protection
of the public interest.
Judge Miller's view receives collateral support from Illinois v.
Somerville,52 the latest Supreme Court decision to consider the
circumstances that justify a mistrial declaration without the defendant's
consent. In Somerville, the trial court declared a mistrial when it was
discovered that the indictment charging the defendant insufficiently stated
the elements of the offense. The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's
action as within his discretionary powers and untainted by prosecutorial
manipulation or undue harassment. In response to Jorn's emphasis on
the defendant's right to receive the first tribunal's verdict, the Court stated
that the Jorn decision "did not hold that that right may never be forced to
yield, as in this case, to the 'public's interest in fair trials designed to end in
just judgments.' "" It is apparent that Judge Miller subscribed to this view
because he felt that, despite Robert Wallace's considerable interest in
receiving the original verdicts on the four counts of the indictment,
society's interest in a total adjudication of the crime should prevail.
Because the intervention of the doctrine of collateral estoppel could have
defeated society's interest, the potential effect of this doctrine created, for
Judge Miller, the manifest necessity needed to justify the trial judge's
declaration of a mistrial.
Even though the majority was willing to assume that collateral
estoppel would have applied in the Wallace case, the majority opinion
differed from the dissent on whether the potential effect of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel should justify the declaration of a mistrial. The
majority's view represents a more accommodating view of the dictates of
the fifth amendment, as well as of the public's rights. The prosecution had
had a complete opportunity to convince the jury of the facts needed to
convict Robert Wallace. If the issue of Wallace's presence at the scene of
the crime or his possession of a deadly weapon had been decided in his
50. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
51. 170 U.S. 262 (1897).
52. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
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favor, then, quite simply, the prosecution had failed to carry its burden of
proof. In Wallace, the defendant had undergone the entire trial and
received verdicts on four of the five counts; society's interest in receiving a
total adjudication on these counts and the issues they encompassed had
been satisfied. It would indeed be grossly unjust to force an individual
into a renewed state of anxiety, ordeal and embarrassment under such
conditions.
Absent extenuating circumstances, such as the wartime environment
in Wade, mandatory acceptance of partial verdicts would further fifth
amendment objectives and would not contravene the public's interest in
prosecuting the accused. Society does not injustice deserve, nor should
the defendant be required to undergo, a retrial of any issues fully
dtermined in a prior adjudication. To allow such retrial would
contravene the defendant's constitutional rights. The injustice is
particularly apparent when, as in Wallace, each count could be resolved
independently of the others; if each count had been tried separately, the
judge would clearly have abused his discretion by declaring a mistrial
absent proof of manifest necessity. There is no logical reason for a
different result merely because the counts are joined in one indictment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wallace v. Havener presented the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals with
the opportunity to review a trial judge's refusal to accept a partial verdict
and the subsequent retrial of the entire case. The controlling standard of
review for the resolution of the Wallace issue was the manifest necessity
test enunciated in United States v. Perez.5 4  Although this standard
contains inherent ambiguities, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the test to
require the state to prove the existence of circumstances that justify the
retrial. The Sixth Circuit failed to discern any justifying circumstances;
the court specifically rejected the state's contention that the trial judge's
action was justified by the potential.effect of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel on the retrial of the undecided issue.
The Sixth Circuit's decision for Wallace provides the soundest
interpretation of the Perez test. Robert Wallace had undergone the rigors
of an entire trial and had been deprived of the opportunity to receive the
partial verdict. Society's interest in litigating those matters had been
satisfied. That the doctrine of collateral estoppel might have affected the
subsequent relitigation of the undecided issue does not mean that the
53. Id. at 470.
54. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
1978]
392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:380
public's rights have been deprecated; it means that at some crucial point,
the prosecution failed to carry its burden of proof. The Sixth Circuit has
recognized this distinction and has struck a sound and practical balance
between society's right to full adjudication of alleged criminal activity and
the protection given the accused by the double jeopardy clause.
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